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This paper studies a …rm’s choice between employing a worker and
using an independent contractor to carry out a task. If the …rm hires
a worker, all residual rights reside with the …rm. In contrast, when
the …rm deals with an independent contractor, it cannot interfere with
the way the task is undertaken. The …rm’s future actions may impose
non-pecuniary costs to the worker, and as a result the worker requires
an ex-ante compensation. The …rm can economize on the up-front
cost by hiring an independent contractor. Independent contracting is a
commitment device which ensures that the principal will not intervene
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1in the future. However, when the …rm has superior private information
that is relevant to the execution of the task, the …rm faces a trade-
o¤ between paying lower costs by hiring an independent contractor
and keeping the option of value-enhancing intervention in employment
relationship.
21 Introduction
In the provision of intermediate inputs or services, a …rm can either hire labor
to produce within the …rm, or subcontract with another …rm to deliver the
…nished product. In many contexts, the choice is determined by the relative
cost of these two types of transaction. These costs include not only the cost
of hiring, …ring, and training, but also the transaction costs associated with
bargaining, contracting, and monitoring performance. The transaction costs
are zero if the agents are fully informed and the contracts are complete and
enforceable. In this case, the organization of production is irrelevant since
e¢ciency can be achieved in both cases. If, however, the transaction takes
place in an imperfect environment, the transaction costs will di¤er depending
on the organizational structure. As it has been argued by Coase [3] and
Williamson [15], di¤erent organizational formsemerge in the market economy
in order to minimize these costs. Similarly, when a …rm decides whether
to organize production as an employment relationship or as independent
contracting, it considers the transaction costs associated with each of them.
An organizational structure is a set of rules that govern a relationship.
Each organization adopts di¤erent rules which, in turn, in‡uence in a dif-
ferent manner incentives of the agents. In this paper, we study two ways of
organizing production: in-house production, which we refer to as the employ-
ment relationship, and independent contracting. These two organizational
structures di¤er in terms of the allocation of ownership rights over physical
assets (Grossman and Hart [5], Klein, Crawford and Alchian [8]), the moni-
toring instruments used in the relationship (Khalil and Lawarrée [9]), and the
compensation (Alchian and Demsetz [1], and Holmstrom [6]).1 However, the
fundamental distinction between the employment relationship and indepen-
dent contracting is the allocation of residual control rights over production.
As noted by Coase [3], and Simon [14], in the employment relationship, the
employer has the authority to direct the activities of the employee. This
observation has often been criticized on the grounds that the sources of this
authority remain unexplained.2 However, Masten [11] argues that there is
1Holmstrom and Milgrom [7] provide an analysis of how these choices are intertwined
in the …rm’s decision.
2For example, Alchian and Demsetz [1], and Jensen and Meckling [10] disagree with
the view that the …rm has superiority in terms of authority. The former argues that
transactions are organized within a …rm as a result of technological inseparabilities which
require team production. The latter views the …rm as the nexus of contractual relationship,
3a clear di¤erence in the legal treatment of the employment relationship and
the independent contracting because of the allocation of the authority among
the parties. On legal grounds, these two types of transaction are perceived as
being di¤erent in terms of obligations, sanctions, and procedures governing
the exchange.3 In this paper, we analyze how di¤erences in the allocation
of authority in‡uence the …rm’s choice between the employment relationship
and independent contracting.
The use of the authority in the employment relationship is redundant in
an environment where complete contracts can be written. Since the initial
contract speci…es the obligations of each party in every conceivable state of
the nature, there is no need for ex-post interventions in the relationship. We
assume, however, that writing comprehensive contracts is not feasible due to
high transaction costs (see Coase [3], Klein, Alchian and Crawford [8], and
Williamson [15]). Thus, when an unexpected contingency arises the initial
contract must specify what is to be done. One way to accomplish this is
by assigning residual control rights to the parties (as in Grossman and Hart
[5]) in the initial contract. Alternatively, the …rm4 can choose either the
employment relationship, so that she retains the residual control rights, or
independent contracting, so that she forgoes these rights which are given to
the contractor.5
The model is an extension of the classical principal-agent model. The
…rm (principal) contracts with a risk-neutral agent to carry out a project.
The principal cannot observe the agent’s action, which can be thought of, as
his exerted e¤ort level. Therefore, she has to o¤er him an incentive contract
rejecting any advantages or limitations that arise from internal organization.
3The following quote from Masten ([11], p.158) supports this view:
Upon entering an employment relationship, for example, every employee ac-
cepts an implied duty to “yield obedience to all reasonable rules, orders, and
instructions of the employer”...
... whereas, “an ‘ independent’ contractor is generally de…ned as one who in
rendering services exercises an independent employment or occupation and
represents his employer only as a results of his work and not as the means
whereby it is to be done”...
4Throughout the paper we will refer to the …rm/principal as “she” and the em-
ployer/contractor/agent as “he”.
5In this paper we are not, modelling the ex-post bargaining problem. We assume that
the …rm has all the bargaining power, hence in the equilibrium of the bargaining game,
the …rm pays the worker his reservation utility and receives the residual.
4to induce him to choose the e¢cient level of e¤ort. After the agent chooses
an e¤ort level, both the principal and the agent receive private signals of the
project’s future pro…tability. It is under the discretion of the party with the
control rights to take an action conditional upon the signal he/she observes.
These actions not only a¤ect the distribution of pro…ts but also impose a
non-pecuniary cost to the agent. We assume that neither the signal nor the
action is contractible. Therefore, the initial contract only speci…es how the
production is organized. In other words, if the employment relationship is
chosen, the principal has the right to decide the second stage action based on
the private signal she receives. On the other hand, if independent contract-
ing is chosen, the agent makes this decision based on his information. The
principal’s problem in an employment relationship is to design a contract
that will induce the agent to exert the optimal e¤ort level in the …rst stage.
In independent contracting, she also wants to align the agent’s incentives
regarding the second stage action with her incentives.
In addition to the moral hazard problem, in the employment relationship,
there also exist a commitment problem. Since the principal cannot commit
ex-ante to a second stage decision, she may have to compensate the agent for
the unexpected intervention. The …rm can economize on the up-front cost
by hiring an independent contractor. If there is no informational asymmetry
over the signals received, then the principal prefers independent contracting
over the employment relationship. Independent contracting can be viewed
as a commitment device that ensures that in the future the principal will not
intervene in the production. As it has been discussed earlier by Williamson
[15], the inability of the parties to intervene selectively may be the cause
of organizing production in the market rather than internally. When we
introduce an informational asymmetry, and in particular, as the agent’s in-
formation is inferior to the principal’s information, the bene…ts from having
residual control rights outweighs the cost of compensating the agent. Thus,
the employment relationship is the preferred organizational form.
Our model improves the employment relationship model developed by
Simon [14], by adding the moral hazard problem. Simon [14] compares the
employment relationship, where the employer has the ‡exibility to postpone
decisions regarding production until after the uncertainty is resolved, to con-
tingent contracting. His model, however, ignores the moral hazard problem
that may exist in the employment relationship. Even though the principal
has given the authority to direct the agent’s actions in the employment rela-
tionship, some dimensions of his actions, such as the e¤ort he exerts, cannot
5be monitored and therefore cannot be contracted upon. We use a principal-
agent model to describe the employment relationship in order to emphasize
the impact of the contractual incompleteness that exists in relationships in-
volving human capital. Our model is also related to Grossman and Hart [5].
Their paper examines the relationship between the two …rms and the alloca-
tion of residual control rights over physical assets when there is contractual
incompleteness. Our paper can be viewed as an application of the incomplete
contracts framework to an employment relationship. While they study the
role of ownership over physical assets, we study the role of authority over
human assets. We de…ne authority as the residual control rights over the
production process and analyze its implications in a principal-agent setting.
Their model focuses on the hold-up problem, and consequently on the distor-
tions that arise in relationship-speci…c investments, in an environment where
contracts are incomplete in every respect. In this model we focus on the
contracting problems when there is partial incompleteness.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents
the basic model. The pareto e¢cient contract is analyzed in section 2.1,
the employment relationship is presented in section 2.2 and the independent
contracting is presented in section 2.3. Section 3 analyzes the model where
normality of all random variables is assumed. The pareto optimal contract
is analyzed in section 3.1. In section 3.2 the employment relationship is
discussed for two cases; when the principal can commit to an intervention
rule and when she cannot. Section 3.3 presents the optimal contract in
independent contracting. The organizational forms are compared in section
4. Conclusions are presented in section 5.
2 The Basic Model
We consider a principal-agent relationship in which the principal contracts
with the agent to carry out a one-time project. The project generates pro…t ¼
which is partly determined by the agent’s actions. After they sign a contract
the agent chooses his e¤ort level which is assumed to take two values e 2
feL;eHg with 0 < eL < eH. Before pro…ts realized, both parties privately
observe a noisy signal s of pro…t. The distribution of s is determined by e
and given by the function G(s j e). We assume that G(s j eH) …rst order
stochastically dominates G(s j eL).
Afterthe private signalsare received, the party with control rightschooses
6an action A which a¤ects the distribution of future pro…ts. In the sim-
plest form we can assume that there are two possible actions available to
the party with residual control rights.; “intervene” and “not intervene”, i.e.:
A = fI;NIg. Intervention, which can be in the form of partial liquidation of
…rm’s assets, reorganization of production or redirection of the project, re-
duces the project’s risk. Let F (¼ j s;e) = FA (¼ j s;e) denote the conditional
probability distribution function of pro…ts conditional on signal s, e¤ort e,
and action A. We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1:6 For each s 2 <, there exists b ¼(s) such that
FI (¼ j s;e) < FNI (¼ j s;e) for ¼ (s) < b ¼ (s)
and
FI (¼ j s;e) > FNI (¼ j s;e) for ¼ (s) > b ¼ (s)
The assumption implies that for each signal s, intervening is safer than not
intervening, which has fatter lower and upper tails.
We assume that none of the variables, e, s or A are contractible. The non-
contractibility of e requires the principal to o¤er an incentive contract to the
agent in order to induce him to exert high levels of e¤ort. This contract can
only be written contingent on the veri…able realized pro…ts. Moreover, the
non-contractibility of s and A necessitates the allocation of residual control
rights in the initial contract, which in turn, determines the organizational
form chosen.7 In the employment relationship, these rights are given to the
employer (the principal) and in independent contracting they are assigned
to the contractor (the agent). Essentially the party with the residual control
rights, after observing the signal, decides which action, A = fI;NIg should
be taken.
Both the principal and the agent are assumed to be risk neutral. The
agent has reservation utility U0. The agent’s utility function is additively
separable, H (w(¼);e) = w(¼) ¡ v(e) ¡ ±¿(A), where w (¼) is the compen-
sation scheme, v(e) measures agent’s disutility for choosing action e and it
6See Dewatripont and Tirole [4].
7Notice that if either s or A were is contractible then we can either write the initial
contract contingent upon the signal observed or the action taken. In other words, if s
is contractible, it is feasible for the principal to o¤er a contract in the following form.
The agent is paid a linear compensation and the cost of intervention ±, if s is less than a
particular cuto¤ point. Otherwise he will only receive the linear compensation. On the
other hand if s is not contractible but A is, then we can made the additional payment of
± contingent upon the action I being chosen.
7is increasing, strictly convex, and twice di¤erentiable. In addition to the
disutility of e¤ort, there is also a nonpecuniary cost ±; incurred by the agent
in the event of intervention, regardless of who initiated the decision to in-
tervene. Finally ¿(A) is an indicator function where it takes the value 0 if
there is no intervention and 1 if there is an intervention. ± can be thought as
the disutility the agent bears as a result of reorganization of the production.
The sequence of events is as follows. The organizational form is chosen and
the contract is signed. Then the agent chooses an action e, that determines
the distribution of ¼. Before the realization of ¼, each party observes a noisy
signal of pro…ts, s. Then the party in control decides whether or not to in-
tervene. At the end of the period, pro…ts are realized and shared according
to the initial contract.
2.1 Optimal Contract With Observable E¤ort and Per-
fect Commitment
Before examining the optimal incentive scheme under di¤erent organizational
forms, we …rst examine the Pareto optimal contract under full information
and perfect commitment. In this case, the principal observes the action the
agent is taking and ex-ante commits to an intervention rule. Thus, the prin-






























g (s j e)ds ¸ U0:
The optimal contract isa…xed wagecontract sincethe action isobservable




g (s j eH)ds and the program can be written as
max
















The …rst term in the maximand is the expected pro…ts if there is no inter-
vention. The second term is the monetary gain from intervention. The third
term is the expected cost of intervention. The principal chooses an inter-
vention rule that maximizes the net gain from intervention. The following
lemma describes the optimal intervention rule.




[FNI (¼ j s;eH) ¡ FI (¼ j s;eH)]d¼] · 0 for all s and ¼ and
2. 9b s such that EI [¼ j b s;eH] = ENI [¼ j b s;eH]
then the optimal intervention rule is a cut-o¤ rule.8
Proof. From condition (2) we have
Z
[FNI (¼ j b s;eH) ¡ FI (¼ j b s;eH)]d¼ = 0:
Together with the condition (1) it follows that
R
[FNI (¼ j s;eH) ¡FI (¼ j s;eH)]d¼ ¸ 0 for s < b s
< 0 for s > b s:
Due to the monotonicity assumption, there exists s¤ that is smaller than b s
and satis…es
FNI (¼ j s
¤;eH) ¡FI (¼ j s
¤;eH) ¡ ± = 0
Thus, the set signals in which an intervention occurs is I = fs j s < s¤g and
the optimal intervention rule is a cut-o¤ rule. As long as
ENI (¼ j eH) ¡ v(eH) > ENI (¼ j eL) ¡ v(eL)
then it is socially e¢cient to implement eH:
8As a convention, we use inde…nite integral when integral is taken over the entire
domain of a variable.
9Note that the optimal contract can also be written contingent on the
intervention. In other words it is feasible to write a contract that promises to
pay the agent di¤erent amounts depending on whether or not the intervention
takes place. Given this contract, the optimal intervention rule is the same
as before. The agent is paid U0 + v(eH) if there is no intervention and
U0 + v(eH) + ± if there is an intervention.
2.2 Employment Relationship
In the employment relationship, the party in control is the principal. She
wants to maximize her expected pro…ts subject to the agent’s individual
rationality and the incentive compatibility constraint. This case is more
complicated than the simple principal-agent problem. Each contract that
the principal proposes to the agent induces a subgame in which the agent
chooses an action and the principal decides whether to intervene or not. The
game is one of imperfect information. At the time the principal decides
whether to intervene or not, she does not know which action the agent has
taken. In the rest of the model we will restrict attention to a set of linear
contracts such that w (¼) = ®¼+¯ where ® 2 [0;1] and ¯ 2 <. The principal
solves the following program.
max
®;¯ (1 ¡ ®)[ENI (¼ j se;eH) + ¡(se;eH)] ¡ ¯
s:t E (w(¼) j se;eH) ¡ v(eH) ¸ U0
E (w(¼) j se;eH) ¡v(eH) ¸ E (w(¼) j se
L;eL) ¡v(eL)
where
E (w (¼) j s;ei) = ¯ + ®[ENI (¼ j ei) + ¡(s;ei)] ¡±G(s j ei)







¼fI (¼ j s;e)d¼ ¸
Z
¼fNI (¼ j s;e)d¼
¾
is the optimal intervention rule.
The principal maximizes the expected net pro…ts subject to agent’s in-
dividual rationality constraint, the incentive compatibility constraint, and
10the principal’s ex post intervention rule. By the time the principal decides
whether to intervene or not, the contract has been signed and the agent has
chose an e¤ort level. Due to the linearity of the contract, the principal sim-
ply compares the expected pro…ts with intervention with the one without
intervention.
Lemma 2 : The optimal intervention rule is a cuto¤ rule where the princpal
intervenes in the project if the signal observed is less than se and does not
intervene otherwise.
It is trivial to show that due to the second assumption of the lemma (1)se
is in fact equal to b s and greater than s¤.
Proposition 3 If it is socially optimal to implement eH then there exists a
contract where ® = 1 and
¯ = U0 + v(eH) + ±G(s
e j eH) ¡ ENI (¼ j eH) ¡ ¡(s
e;eH)
that implement (eH;se).
Corollary 4 The payment to the agent (the expected net surplus) in ER is
greater (smaller) than the payment to the agent (the expected net surplus) in
the …rst best case.
wFB = U0 + v(eH) + ±G(s
¤ j eH)
wER = U0 + v(eH) + ±G(s
e j eH)
2.3 Independent Contracting
In this case the control rights are given to the agent. After the signal is
observed the agent intervenes in the project if
®
Z
¼fI (¼ j s;e)d¼ ¡ ± ¸ ®
Z
¼fNI (¼ j s;e)d¼
Lemma 1 The optimal intervention rule is a cuto¤ rule where the princpal
intervenes in the project if the signal observed is less than sI(®) and does not
intervene otherwise.
11The treshehold level of the signal for the agent’s intervention rule depends
on ®. If ® = 1 then the agent’s interventionn rule is the same as the …rst
best intervention rule s¤. Given the agent’s optimal intervention rule the




















w (¼) j sI;eH
´
¡ v(eH) ¸ E
³
w (¼) j sI;eL
´
¡ v(eL)
Proposition 5 If it is socially optimal to implement eH then there exists a
contract where ® = 1and
¯ = U0 + v(eH) + ±G(s
¤ j eH) ¡ ENI (¼ j eH) ¡ ¡(s
¤;eH)
that implement (eH;s¤).
The results of the basic model can be summarized as follows:
² Principal prefersindependent contracting overemployment relationship
since payment to the agent is lower in the former case.
² Independent contracting is also the e¢cient organizational form since
it implements the e¢cient e¤ort and the e¢cient intervention rule.
² Choosing independent contracting can be viewed as a commitment de-
vice which ensures that the principal will not intervene in the future.
In the next section we present an example where the contracts are linear
and in addition the signal received by the agent isa garbling of the principal’s
signal. We examine how the solution to the simple principal-agent model
changes with the introduction of a non-contractible action, and how the
allocation of control rights in‡uences the optimal contracts.
123 Example
Let v(eL) = 0 and v(eH) = K > 0: Consider a linear compensation scheme
for the agent in the form of w(¼) = ®¼ + ¯ where ® 2 [0;1]and ¯ 2 <: The
distribution of ¼, conditional on e is assumed to be a normal with mean \e"
and variance \e2". Therefore “low e¤ort” generates low, but safer pro…ts,
while “high e¤ort” generates high, but riskier pro…ts. The principal observes
the signal sP = ¼+" and the agent observes sA = ¼ +"+´, where the noise
term " isassumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance ¾2
",
and ´ is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance ¾2
´.
We set up the model in such a way that the agent’s information is a garbling
of the principal’s information. After the signal is observed, the party in
control decides whether or not to intervene. For simplicity, intervention is
assumed to scale down pro…ts by a factor ¸, where ¸ 2 [0;1]. Hence, both
the expected pro…tability, and the riskiness of the project are reduced after
intervention.
Given the marginal distributions of ¼ and s conditional on e, the dis-
tribution of ¼ conditional on s and e is derived using Bayes’ rule, and it
is
















´. Note that the conditional
mean of pro…ts, given the signal, is a convex combination of e and s. As the
noise term increases, the signal becomes uninformative about future pro…ts,
and the conditional mean of pro…ts approaches the unconditional mean, e.
As the noise becomes smaller, the signal becomes informative, and the condi-
tional mean approaches the realized pro…ts. The following lemma states that
the values of s, for which the intervention takes place, is strictly lower-tailed.
Lemma 6 The optimal intervention rule is a cut-o¤ rule.
Proof. It is su¢cient to examine whether the conditions of Lemma 1 are sat-
is…ed. The derivative of
R
[FNI (¼ j si;eH) ¡FI (¼ j si;eH)]d¼ with respect







which is negative since ¸ 2 [0;1]. There exists b si
which is equal to ¡
¾2
i
e . Therefore the intervention rule is a cut-o¤ rule.
133.1 Pareto Optimal Contract
The …rst-best is achieved if the principal has perfect information and there is
no a commitment problem. In this environment, the pareto optimal contract
is obtained by maximizing the principal’s expected net pro…ts subject to the
agent’s participation constraint. Since the principal’s signal is a su¢cient
statistic for the agent’s signal, the beliefs about the distribution of pro…ts is
updated by the principal’s signal, sP. Let










denote the expected pro…ts when the e¤ort level eH is chosen by the agent
and the cut-o¤ rule for intervention is sP. The …rst term is the unconditional
expected pro…t and the second term, which in the future we will denote as
l(sPH;eH), is the di¤erence in the expected pro…ts due to the intervention.
The value of l(sPH;eH) is negative for sP < ¡
¾2
i
e , therefore, it can be inter-
preted as the expected losses recovered by intervention. The Pareto optimal
contract is generated by the program:
max
®;¯;sP
(1 ¡ ®)E (¼ j sP;eH) ¡¯
s.to ®E (¼ j sP;eH) + ¯ ¡K ¡ ±G(sP j eH) ¸ w0
where w0 is the agent’s expected outside wage. The following lemma provides
a condition under which there exists an optimal contract that implements eH
and the …rst-best intervention rule.





intervene if sP · s¤
P













The agent’s individual rationality constraint is binding, which gives us
the total compensation the agent is paid, w (¼). Substituting w(¼) into the
maximand and solving for sP, yields s¤
P, the cut-o¤ point for the optimal
intervention rule. The following proposition describes the optimal contracts.











holds. There exists a continuum of …rst-best incentive schemes (®;¯) that im-




g (s j aH)ds =
®E (¼ j s¤
PH;eH) + ¯.
Condition (1) implies that it is socially desirable to choose “high e¤ort”.9
The optimal contract paysthe agent w¤(¼) which isthe sumof his reservation
wage, the disutility from exerting high levels of e¤ort, and the expected cost
of intervention. The …xed payment contract where




g (s j aH)ds
is one of the solutions to the problem. With full information there is no
moral hazard problem. A contract that pays w¤(¼)to the agent, if he exerts
high e¤ort, can be implemented. Since there is also no commitment problem,
the allocation of residual control rights is irrelevant. The optimal interven-
tion rule that the intervention will take place when a signal sPH · s¤
PH is
observed, can be speci…ed in the initial contract.
3.2 Employment Relationship
In an employment relationship, the principal has the residual control rights
over production and decides whether or not to intervene depending on the
signal, sP, she receives. There are two problems that cause the employment
relationship model to deviate from the pareto optimal case. First, there is
a moral hazard problem, due to the unobservability of the agent’s actions
by the principal. Therefore, the principal has to o¤er an incentive payment
scheme to the agent. Second, there is a commitment problem, due to non-
contractibility of intervention. In order to correctly identify the sources of
deviations from the …rst-best solution correctly we solve the problem in two
stages, adding one friction at a time.
9In a simple principal-agent model, condition (1) corresponds to the condition that
eH ¡eL ¸ K .
153.2.1 Principal can commit to an intervention rule
We …rst assume that the principal can commit to an intervention rule. In
other words, we assume that s is ex-ante contractible. Then the optimal
contract solves the following program:
max
®;¯;s (1 ¡ ®)E (¼ j sP;eH) ¡¯
subject to
®E (¼ j sP;eH) + ¯ ¡ K ¡ ±G(s j aH) ¸ w0
and
®E (¼ j sP;eH) + ¯ ¡ K ¡ ±G(s j aH) ¸
®E (¼ j sP;eH) + ¯ ¡ ±G(s j aL)
Proposition 9 If it is socially optimal to implement eH (i.e. condition (1)
holds), then there exists a continuum of …rst best incentive schemes (®;¯)
that implement (eH;s¤
PH), such that, the agent is paid a total compensation










Since the principal cannot observe the e¤ort level of the agent, she has
to o¤er him an incentive contract. It is a well known result in principal-
agent theory, that when the agent is risk neutral, making the agent residual
claimant is an optimal solution. Since sis assumed to be contractible, there
is no commitment problem. Giving the agent residual claimancy with a fee
of F = E¦(s¤
PH;eH) ¡w¤(¼)(i.e.: ® = 1 and ¯ = w¤(¼) ¡E¦(s¤
PH;eH) < 0
which is in fact the payment to the principal) is one of the optimal solutions
to the program. Again the individual rationality constraint is binding. The
incentivecompatibility constraint is not bindingsincethe principal can adjust
¯ accordingly as long as ® is greater than the lower bound. There is a
constraint on the values that ® is allowed to take in order for ® 2 (0;1)












Condition (1) is su¢cient for condition (2) tohold (see Appendix). Therefore,
as longaseH ise¢cient level of e¤ort, there existsa linearcontract that would
induce the agent to choose eH.
163.2.2 Principal cannot commit to an intervention rule
Now we consider the case where the principal cannot commit ex-ante to an
intervention rule contingent on sP. After the principal observes the signal sP,
she updates her belief about the distribution of pro…ts ¼, and decides whether
or not to intervene in the project. The expected value of pro…ts, given the




" which is a convex combination of e and sP.
Since the contract has already been signed, w(¼), the compensation to the
agent, is a sunk cost from principal’s point of view. Therefore, when she
decides whether or not to intervene she is concerned only about the overall




a as the cut-o¤









intervene if sP · sER
P
do not intervene if sP > sER
P
:
It is worthwhile to note that sE
P > s¤
P. Thus, if the principal cannot commit
ex ante to an intervention rule, she intervenes more often than the socially
optimal rule.
At the beginning of the game, when the principal o¤ers a contract to
the agent both parties will take the principal’s ex-post intervention rule into
consideration. As we discussed earlier, every contract induces a subgame
between the principal and the agent, in which the agent chooses an action,
and the principal decides whether or not to intervene. The equilibria of these
subgames are re‡ected in the principal’s problem which is as follows:
max
































































17holds, then there exist a continuum of linear contracts (®;¯) that implement
(sER
















Condition (3) states that eH is the principal’s preferred action under her
optimal intervention rule. Condition (3) is a su¢cient but not a necessary
condition for condition (1). In other words, eH may not be an optimal action
for the principal, even if it is socially optimal. The lower bound for ® which


























holds. The condition (3) is su¢cient for the condition (4). In other words,
there exists a linear contract that would implements eH, if it is the principal’s
preferred e¤ort level.
Note that we deliberately excluded the case of ® = 1 from the solution
set. If the agent becomes residual claimant, the principal’s incentive to inter-
fere in the project is distorted, since she gets a …xed rent from the agent in
every state. Then the problem is reduced to a simple principal-agent prob-
lem without intervention. In this case, the expected value of the principal’s






















, that is intervention provides positive
gains. Therefore, the principal prefers to set ® < 1 and intervene in the
project.






expected payment to the agent is higher, and the principal’s net surplus is
lower, in the non-commitment case than in the commitment case.
In both cases the agent’s compensation is the sum of his outside wage,
w0, the disutility from exerting high levels of e¤ort, K, and the expected
cost of intervention, ±G(sPH;eH). Since the cut-o¤ point for intervention is
greater in the case of non-commitment the expected costs are higher and the
worker is paid a higher compensation. The principal pays a premium to the
agent in the non-commitment case because she intervenes more often.
The principal’s net surplus, eH ¡(1 ¡¸)l(sPH;eH)¡K¡±G(sPH;eH)¡








In the case of independent contracting, the principal has no further role
after the contract is signed. We …rst characterize the optimal intervention
rule after the agent observes his signal. The agent observes a signal sA,
which is noisier than the principal’s signal. After observing his signal, the
agent decides whether or not to intervene taking into account his expected
compensation rather than the project’s expected pro…ts. Having the residual
control rights, the agent trades o¤ the cost of intervention with its bene…t.
The agent will intervene in the project if the expected compensation after
intervention is greater than the one without intervention,
®¸E (¼ j sA;e) + ¯ ¡ K ¡ ± ¸ ®E (¼ j sA;e) + ¯ ¡ K:









e2®(1¡¸) , as the cut-o¤ for





intervene if sA · sI
A
do not intervene if sA > sI
A
: (5)
When designing an incentive scheme, the principal takes into account the
agent’s optimal decision rule. The optimal contract not only induces the
agent to choose eH but also aligns his incentives to intervene with hers. The










































The following lemma provides the solution to this program.
Lemma 12 If it is socially optimal to implement eH (i.e.: condition (1)
holds), then there exists an optimal incentive scheme that makes the agent
the residual claimant and implements (eH;sI
AH). This contract is given by








H depends on ®. The choice of ® will not only induce the agent
to exert high levels of e¤ort but it will also in‡uence the agent’s decision to
intervene. If only linear contracts are available, then there does not exist a
contract that perfectly aligns the agent’s incentives with the principal’s. In
other words, there does not exist an ® 2 [0;1] that equalizes sI
AH with sE
AH.
4 Comparison of the Two Organizational Form
In any organizational form, the critical value of s, which determines the in-
tervention rule, is decreasing in ¾2, the variance of the noise term in the
signal. As the signal becomes noisier, the probability of intervention goes
down. This reduces the expected cost of intervention and also increases the
losses recovered by intervention. Thus, the net bene…t from intervention
goes up. In the model, we assume that the principal and the agent observe
di¤erent signals. In particular, the agent’s signal is a garbling of the princi-
pal’s signal. As a benchmark, we now consider the case in which both the
principal and the agent receive the same signal before the actual pro…ts are
realized. This is a special case of the model where ¾2
´, the additional noise
term in the agent’s signal equals zero. Then, the optimal contract in inde-
pendent contracting is Pareto e¢cient, since the cut-o¤ point for the agent’s
optimal intervention rule becomes s¤
PH which is the …rst best intervention
rule and the optimal contract implements (eH;s¤
PH). Given Lemma (11), the
principal prefers independent contracting over the employment relationship
as the organizational form, since in the former her net surplus is greater. In
independent contracting the principal saves on the up-front payment to the
agent which she would have to pay in the employment relationship.
As the agent’s signal becomes noisier, intervention in independent con-
tracting is ine¢cient. The agent intervenes less than the optimal level which
results with “underinvestment”. Even though he is the residual claimant
under the optimal contract, his incentives are distorted because his infor-
mation is noisier than the principal’s information. As the variance of the
signal increases, the losses from underinvestment outweighs the gains from
the compensation paid to the worker, and the principal …nds the employ-
ment relationship more desirable. The following proposition summarizes this
result.
Proposition 13 When ¾2
´ = 0, the principal prefers independent contracting
20over the employment relationship. In this case, independent contracting is
also Pareto e¢cient. For small values of ¾2
´, independent contracting contin-
ues to dominate the employment relationship. As the agent’s signal becomes


























be the corresponding function under independent contracting.
When ¾2
´ = 0, both the principal and the agent observes the same signal.
From the result of the lemma 12 the independent contracting implements
the …rst best. From the result of the lemma 11, the net surplus of the
























stays constant. As ¾2






to 0 from right. Thus, the principal’s expected pro…ts under independent












also approaches 0. We can …nd ¾2
" which is su¢-





is greater than 0. Therefore for each values
of ¾2
" there exists ¾2























. In other words, if the agent’s signal is very noisy,
then the principal’s pro…ts under employment relationship is greater than
her pro…ts under independent contracting.
If the principal’s signal isperfectly informative, i.e.: ¾2
" = 0, then forsmall
¾2
´, the independent contracting continues to be the principal’s preferred
organizational form. When ¾2
" = 0, the principal intervenes whenever the
signal received is less than 0. However the optimal intervention rule trades
o¤ the bene…t from intervention with its cost in the margin. The e¢cient
intervention rule proposes that intervention takes place when s · ¡
±
1¡¸ .
When the agent’s information is not very noisy, the intervention rule under
independent contracting is closer to the e¢cient intervention rule than the
intervention rule under the employment relationship. As ¾2
´ becomes larger,
however, the agent intervenes very infrequently so that the principal prefers
the employment relationship.
215 Concluding Remarks
We study a …rm’s decision to choose between employing a worker and using
an independent contractor to carry out a task. We analyze this problem
using a two-stage principal-agent model. We derive conditions under which
an optimal contract, which implements high e¤ort level, eH, of the worker,
exists. When we restrict the set of feasible contracts to those that are linear
in pro…ts, eH can be implemented under independent contracting, as long
as it is socially e¢cient. In the employment relationship, however, the lin-
ear contracts that implements eH exist only for certain parameter values of
the model. The intervention decision remains ine¢cient under both organi-
zational structures. The ine¢ciency in the employment relationship arises
because the principal cannot commit ex ante to an intervention rule. When
she makes the second stage decision, she does not take into account the costs
incurred by the agent as a result of herintervention. Thus, in the employment
relationship, there is “too much” intervention. Even though the commitment
problem is avoided in independent contracting by delegating the intervention
decision to the agent, there is “too little” intervention. The distortion in the
agent’s intervention decision is created by the agents’s inferior information.
When both parties receive the same signal, thus, there is no informational
asymmetry, independent contracting is Pareto e¢cient organizational form.
The optimal contract implements both the …rst-best e¤ort level and the in-
tervention rule. The principal prefers independent contracting because she
receives higher net pro…ts. As the signal of the agent becomes noisier, the
agent’s intervention rule becomes more distorted and the cost-saving advan-
tages of the independent contracting dissipate. Even if the principal’s signal
is perfectly informative about the pro…tability of the project, for small noise
in the agent’s signal, the principal …nds independent contracting more desir-
able than the employment relationship. In the model, we assume that the
agent’s information is worse than the principal’s information. If the agent
possesses better information, then independent contracting always Pareto
dominates the employment relationship. These results support the empirical
evidence presented by Masten [12] who examines the …rm’s integration de-
cision with the upstream …rm in the aerospace industry. He …nds that the
speci…city of the component is a detrimental factor in this decision. As the
component becomes more speci…c, the …rm prefers in-house production to in-
dependent contracting. The speci…city of the component can be interpreted
in our model as the principal having superior information about the project.
22In thismodel we assumethat the playersobserve their signal privately and
there is no communication between them. In the employment relationship
the principal makes the second stage decision. Since the principal’s signal is
a su¢cient statistic for the agent’s signal, communication does not improve
e¢ciency. In independent contracting, however, the agent makes the second
stage decision based on his signal which is noisier than the principal’s signal.
In fact the main source of ine¢ciency in independent contracting is that the
agent has inferior information.
A possible extension to the model above would be to allow communication
in independent contracting. With communication, the principal announces
the signal she observes and based on that announcement the agent decides
whether or not to intervene. If the principal’s announcement is veri…able,
then the outcome of the employment relationship can be replicated in inde-
pendent contracting. The fact that the principal can write a contract that
is contingent on her announcement avoids the non-contractibility problem.
This, in turn, eliminates the need for the allocation of residual control rights.
If the principal’s announcement, however, is not contractible, a contract that
is contingent on the announcement cannot be implemented. When the prin-
cipal announces the signal she observes, she also takes into account how the
agent’s incentives are a¤ected by this announcement. In particular, the cost
of compensating the agent, when information is revealed, may exceed the
bene…ts. Then, the principal may …nd it more desirable not to announce
her information. The complications that may arise in the model is similar
to the problem of incentive contracting with informed principal which was
originally introduced by Myerson [13].
6 Appendices
6.1 Appendix A
Claim: C1 implies C2.
Proof. Rewriting C1 gives









and rewriting C2 gives














implies C2. Since s¤
H > s¤
L, it is su¢cient to prove that (1¡¸)l(s;e)+±G(s;e)
is increasing in s since s¤
H > s¤






which is positive for s > s¤.
6.2 Appendix B
Given ¼ j e » N (e;e2) ;" j e » N (0;¾2
") and sP = ¼ + "; …rst we will derive
the pdf of ¼ j sP;ae:
Using Bayes rule h(¼ j s;e) =
f(¼;sje)
g(sje) and assuming that cov(¼;" j e) = 0,



































































































































s; we see that it is a convex combination of
e = E [¼] and s. As ¾2
" ! 1; the signal becomes uninformative and b ! e
while as ¾2
" ! 0; the signal becomes informative and b ! ¼:
246.3 Appendix C
Let ¹ and ° be the multipliers of the individual rationality and incentive





























¸ 0 if ® = 0
= 0 if ® 2 (0;1)




= ¡1 ¡ ¹ = 0
Substituting ¹ = 1 into @L
@® and setting ´ = 0 (assuming that incentive





























which is less than s¤
PH. Therefore the optimal contract in independent con-









































be the net bene…t from intervention under independent contracting. We …rst
substitute the values of sE
P and sI

























































































which is negative. Therefore as ¾2
´ increases the net bene…t from intervention
in independent contracting decreases.
References
[1] Alchian, A. and H. Demsetz. (1972), “Production, Information Costs,
and Economic Organization, ” American Economic Review, 62, 777-795.
[2] Arrow, K.J. (1975), “Vertical Integration and Communication,” Bell
Journal of Economics, 6, 173-183.
[3] Coase, R. (1937), “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica, 4, 389-405.
[4] Dewatripont, M. and J. Tirole. (1994), “Theory of Debt and Equity: Di-
versity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 109, 1027-1054.
[5] Grossman, S. J. and O. Hart. (1986), “The Costs and Bene…ts of Owner-
ship: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,” Journal of Political
Economy, 94, 691-719.
[6] Holmstrom, B. (1987), “Moral Hazard in Teams,” Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics, 13,324-340.
26[7] Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom. (1994), “The Firm as an Incentive Sys-
tem,” American Economic Review, 84, 972-991.
[8] Klein, B. R. Crawford, and A. Alchian. (1978), “Vertical Integration,
Appropriable Rents and Competitive Contracting Process,” Journal of
Law and Economics, 21, 297-326.
[9] Khalil, F., and J. Lawarrée. (1995), “Input versus Output Monitor-
ing:Who is the Residual Claimant?,” Journal of Economic Theory, 66,
139-157.
[10] Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. (1976), “Theory of the
Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structures,”
Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.
[11] Masten, S. (1991), “A Legal Basis forthe Firm”. in O. Williamson and S.
Winter eds., The Nature of the Firm. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[12] Masten, S. (1984), “The Organization of Production: Evidence from the
Aerospace Industry,” Journal of Law and Economics, 27, 403-418.
[13] Myerson, R. (1983), “Mechanisim Design by an Informed Principal,”
Econometrica, 51, 1767-1797.
[14] Simon, H. A., (1951), “A Formal Theory of Employment Relationship,”
Econometrica, 19, 293-305.
[15] Wiliamson, O. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New
York: Free Press
27